Glocalised constitution-making in the twenty-first century: Evidence from Asia by DE VISSER, Maartje & SON, Bui Ngoc
Singapore Management University 
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 
Research Collection School Of Law School of Law 
7-2019 
Glocalised constitution-making in the twenty-first century: 
Evidence from Asia 
Maartje DE VISSER 
Singapore Management University, mdevisser@smu.edu.sg 
Bui Ngoc SON 
Chinese University of Hong Kong 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research 
 Part of the Asian Studies Commons, and the Public Law and Legal Theory Commons 
Citation 
DE VISSER, Maartje and SON, Bui Ngoc. Glocalised constitution-making in the twenty-first century: 
Evidence from Asia. (2019). Global Constitutionalism. 8, (2), 297-331. Research Collection School Of Law. 
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research/2932 
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Institutional Knowledge at 
Singapore Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Law by an 
authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, 
please email cherylds@smu.edu.sg. 
Global Constitutionalism (2019), 8:2, 297–331 © Cambridge University Press, 2019
doi:10.1017/S2045381719000066
297
Glocalised constitution-making  
in the twenty-first century: Evidence  
from Asia
m a a r t j e  d e  v i s s e r
School of Law, Singapore Management University, 55 Armenian Street, Singapore 179943
Email: mdevisser@smu.edu.sg
n g o c  s o n  b u i
Faculty of Law, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 6/F, Lee Shau Kee Building, Sha Tin, NT,  
Hong Kong
Email: ngocsonbui@cuhk.edu.hk
Abstract: How have Asian nations conducted, or how are they conducting, 
constitution-making in the face of pressures associated with globalisation,  
and how do they balance those forces with domestic interests and realities? 
This article aims to develop an analytical framework that can capture this 
global–local interplay. It introduces the concept of ‘glocalised constitution-
making’ to denote the co-existence and relationship between the two governance 
levels as manifested in the forces, actors and norms pertaining to the process of 
drafting a new constitution as well as its substance. Glocalisation permeates 
the entirety of a constitution-making episode, from the impetus to initiate the 
process, to its design and inclusiveness of interests featured, and the scope of 
topics considered. The effects of glocalised constitution-making for domestic 
drafters are arranged along a continuum with approbation and aversion as the 
polar opposites. The precise location on the continuum will depend on the value 
preferences of the domestic stakeholders and the matters under consideration. 
The application of this analytical framework is illustrated with reference to 
recent constitution-making exercises in Bhutan, Nepal, Thailand, East Timor 
and Sri Lanka.
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I. Introduction
The Grand Masters of comparative law that sought to classify the world’s 
legal systems in the belief that the resulting taxonomies would be useful 
heuristic devices always gave pride of place to Western jurisdictions.1 These 
were often subdivided into smaller categories like English (or common) 
law, Romanesque, Germanic and Nordic law, thereby revealing an implied 
belief that Western law had reached a degree of sophistication that allowed 
for such further nuances. A later categorisation attempt makes this clearer 
still, by recognising the rule of professional law, the rule of political law 
and the rule of traditional law, and including Europe and North America 
in the first of these categories.2 While Asia was never absent from the 
taxonomies, this vast region was typically compressed into the single 
category of ‘Far Eastern’, ‘East Asian’ or ‘Confucian’ law. China and to a 
lesser extent Japan were the exemplars; no other jurisdictions were deemed 
to be of much academic significance. What is more, the Asian category was 
said to be justifiably on the periphery since law was less important in the 
Orient, as societies there ‘are primarily based on personal relations and 
networks’.3
While newer generations of comparatists accept the intellectual loss 
attendant on using a West–East binary as a matter of principle, scholarship 
has so far remained strongly focused on the design and functioning of 
European and North American legal orders. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this is 
also evident in the constitutional branch of the discipline of comparative 
law. Hirschl has poignantly remarked on the preference exhibited within 
comparative constitutional studies to focus on ‘a small set of ‘‘usual 
suspect’’ settings – all prosperous, stable constitutional democracies of the 
“global north”’.4 This unduly limits the evolution of the field: such small 
familiar settings cannot represent constitutional orthodoxy or be used as 
meaningful yardsticks to evaluate constitutional choices. Indeed, despite 
1 JH Wigmore, A Panorama of the World’s Legal Systems (Thomson/West, St Paul, MN, 
1928); P Arminjon, B Nolde and M Wolff, Traité de Droit Comparé (Libraire Générale, 
Paris, 1951); R David, Major Legal Systems in the World Today: An Introduction to the 
Comparative Study of Law (3rd edn, Stevens, London, 1985); K Zweigert and H Kötz, 
Einführung in die Rechtsvergleichung auf dem Gebiete des Privatrechts (3rd edn, Mohr 
Siebeck, Tübingen, 1996). Also J Esquirol, ‘René David: At the Head of the Legal Family’ 
in A Riles (ed), Rethinking the Masters of Comparative Law (Hart, Oxford, 2001).
2 U Mattei, ‘Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World’s Legal Systems’ 
(1997) 44 American Journal of Comparative Law 5.
3 M Siems, Comparative Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014) 81.
4 R Hirschl, Comparative Matters – The Renaissance of Comparative Constitutional Law 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014) 192.
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Glocalised constitution-making in the twenty-first century 299
a welcome increase in recent years in the number of publications that 
are Asia-centric or otherwise feature a discussion of Asian constitutional 
regimes,5 the region remains comparatively underexplored. This is 
particularly concerning as far as the making of new constitutions are 
concerned, since constitutional texts determine or otherwise shape the 
organisation of the state, the exercise of powers and the development 
of inter-institutional and interpersonal relationships.
Writing generally on constitution-building initiatives, Choudhry and 
Ginsburg note that these are ‘poorly understood in part because of the 
sheer diversity of environments in which constitutions are produced’.6 
While it is true that the full set of circumstances surrounding particular 
constitution-making episodes will vary from one country to the next, 
common influences and constraints can be identified as well. In Asia, the 
first wave of modern constitution-making occurred during the period of 
decolonisation and reconstruction after World War II. Notably for the 
former British colonies, this process typically involved the same series of 
steps, strictly controlled by the outgoing colonial administration and 
Westminster.7 Several countries in the region also keenly felt the impact of 
the end of the Cold War, and the resultant need to reconstruct their 
constitutions in a manner to promote democracy and social inclusiveness.8 
With the onset of the new millennium, Asia seems to have entered yet 
5 Leaving aside journal articles, recent book-length treatments of Asian constitutional 
arrangements include A Chen (ed), Constitutionalism in Asia in the Early Twenty-First Century 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014); W-C Chan, L-A Thio, K Tan and J-R Yeh, 
Constitutionalism in Asia – Cases and Materials (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2014); R Dixon 
and T Ginsburg (eds), Comparative Constitutional Law in Asia (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 
2014); J Neo (ed), Constitutional Interpretation in Singapore – Theory and Practice (Routledge, 
Abingdon, 2016); PJ Yap, Courts and Democracies in Asia (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2017); DS Law, H Lau and A Schwartz (eds), Oxford Handbook of Constitutional 
Law in Asia (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2019, forthcoming) as well as, albeit not 
comparative in outlook, the volumes on Thailand, Indonesia, Myanmar, Pakistan, India, 
Taiwan, Singapore, China, Malaysia, Japan and Vietnam in the Constitutional Systems of the 
World Series (Hart Publishing, Oxford).
6 S Choudhry and T Ginsburg, ‘Introduction’ in S Choudhry and T Ginsburg (eds), 
Constitution-Making (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2017).
7 On which, e.g. W Dale, ‘The Making and Remaking of Commonwealth Constitutions’ 
(1993) 42 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 67; B Lapping, End of Empire 
(St Martin’s Press, New York, NY, 1985). Arguably unsurprisingly, this also produced 
constitutions that (strongly) resembled that of the European colonial powers, see e.g. KYL Tan, 
‘The Making and Remaking of Constitutions in Southeast Asia: An Overview’ (2002) 6 
Singapore Journal of International and Comparative Law 1; H Kumarasingham (ed), 
Constitution-making in Asia: Decolonisation and State-building in the Aftermath of the British 
Empire (Routledge, Abingdon, 2016).
8 See e.g. WC Chang, ‘East Asian Foundations for Constitutionalism: Three Models 
Reconstructed’ (2008) 3 National Taiwan University Law Review 111.
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300 maartje de visser and ngoc son bui
another phase of constitution-making. East Timor adopted the nation’s 
first constitution in 2002, with Bhutan following suit in 2008. While the 
Communist Party in Vietnam and its counterpart in Laos initially planned 
to amend their country’s constitutions, new documents were enacted in 
the end (2013 and 2015 respectively). Myanmar (2008), Nepal (2015) and 
Thailand (2017) have replaced their existing constitutional texts in the last 
decade, while Sri Lanka is currently in the throes of a constitution-making 
exercise.
As compared to the earlier stages, a significant common feature of 
the current stage is the ubiquitous presence of globalisation. Countries 
today are more interconnected than ever before as a result of economic 
imperatives, migration and technology. There is a keen interest, amongst 
others on the part of third states and international organisations, in how 
countries design their constitutional systems and regulate internal legal 
relations. The resultant globalised pressures will rub up against domestic 
imperatives, interests and realities. The interplay thus generated is at the 
heart of this article, in which we examine how a sample of Asian nations 
have conducted, or are conducting, constitution-making in the face of the 
non-local forces bearing down on them, while seeking to remain responsive 
to the inevitable municipal dimensions of the process. Our aim in doing so 
is to flesh out a framework that can capture this global–local interplay and 
that, we hope, can be profitably become part of the toolkit for studying 
contemporary processes of constitution-making elsewhere in Asia and 
beyond. In Section II, we introduce the concept of ‘glocalised constitution-
making’ to denote the co-existence and relationship between the two 
governance levels as manifested in the forces, actors and norms pertaining 
to the drafting of a new constitution as well as its substance. We show how 
glocalisation permeates the entirety of a constitution-making episode, 
from the impetus to initiate the process, to its design and inclusiveness of 
interests featured, and the scope of topics considered. Section III considers 
the effects of glocalised constitution-making for domestic drafters. It is 
suggested that these are arranged along a continuum with approbation 
and aversion as the polar opposites. The precise location on the continuum 
will depend on the value preferences of the domestic stakeholders, the 
extent to which international pressures enable them to act on these 
preferences, and the matter under consideration.
Before unfolding our argument, two limitations should be acknowledged. 
The first is methodological. The descriptive accounts below should not be 
taken as providing a comprehensive narrative of the constitution-making 
episodes in the selected Asian states. This is not the purpose of this article; 
it would moreover be presumptuous to attempt to convey the richness and 
complexity of several constitution-making processes in the course of a 
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Glocalised constitution-making in the twenty-first century 301
single article. Rather, the recent Asian experiences will be referenced 
to illustrate how and when glocalisation can manifest itself in the 
contemporary drafting of a new constitution. This ought to give readers 
a good sense of how a glocalised framework can be applied and how this 
helps expose encounters between governance levels that could have 
remained hidden if a purely domestic or purely international lens were 
applied instead.
The second limit is jurisdictional. Even when using national experiences 
only for illustrative purposes, it would not be possible to cover all recently 
completed or ongoing constitution-making exercises in Asia.9 Those that 
will be featured below are Sri Lanka, Nepal, Thailand, East Timor and 
Bhutan.10 This selection is made pursuant to what Hirschl calls the 
‘prototypical cases’ principle.11 As he explains, ‘a prototypical case serves 
as a representative exemplar of other cases exhibiting similar pertinent 
characteristics’, allowing for ‘reasoning by analogy’.12 A core common 
characteristic across the five cases is the temporal dimension: the five 
countries all embarked upon constitution-making projects in the new 
millennium, meaning that all were doing so against the backdrop of similar 
developments and trends at the global level. Beyond that similarity, the 
cases can be arranged on a spectrum ranging from that where international 
actors actively inserted themselves into the constitution-writing exercise to 
the counterfactual example of a process in which international constitution-
hawkers were virtually absent. East Timor is the prototype of a country 
whose new constitution was drafted under the auspices of an international 
organisation, the United Nations, which could – and did – actively shape 
the design of the process to be followed. Nepal and Sri Lanka exemplify 
countries that embarked upon constitution-writing to realise national unity 
by overcoming ethnic conflict, while simultaneously facing considerable 
international pressure to do so in a manner that would ensure that the 
9 Mirroring the (still) dominant trend within the comparative constitutional discourse, 
most recent Asian scholarship studies the judicial application of constitutional rules as opposed 
to the creation thereof, a process during which non-judicial actors take centre stage. In 
addition to the books cited in (n 5), see also A Chen and A Harding (eds), Constitutional 
Courts in Asia – A Comparative Perspective (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2018); J-R Yeh and W-C Chang (eds), Asian Courts in Context (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2015); PJ Yap, Constitutional Dialogue in Common Law Asia (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2015).
10 For Vietnam, see NS Bui, ‘Contextualizing the Global Constitution-Making Process: 
The Case of Vietnam’ (2016) 64 American Journal of Comparative Law 931.
11 R Hirschl, ‘The Question of Case Selection in Comparative Constitutional Law’ (2005) 
53 American Journal of Comparative Law 125, 142–4.
12 Ibid 142.
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302 maartje de visser and ngoc son bui
resultant constitutions would contribute to reducing instability in what 
had hitherto been a volatile part of the region, including for the international 
community’s own benefit. These international pressures were further 
buttressed by powerful economic and trade incentives that indirectly 
circumscribed the room for manoeuvre on the part of the local framers, in 
view of the real need for external financial support to enable Nepal and Sri 
Lanka to transition toward upper-middle income countries. Bhutan is an 
example of a very different kind of country: while the decision to pursue 
regime change to a democratic constitutional monarchy was autochthonous 
in nature, an important motivating factor for the elites was the intention 
to thereby enhance the country’s international credibility. Finally, Thailand 
is a prototype of country where the initiation and design of the constitution-
making process were essentially animated by local concerns and interests – 
establishing stable rule after a long history of coups and sharply polarised 
politics – although the framers were mindful of the fact that a successful 
drafting exercise could also have welcome second-order effects on the 
country’s ability to attract more foreign direct investment (FDI). As we 
explain in detail below, while the strength and nature of global factors 
varies across the five case studies, none is entirely immune from global 
influences: it is clear that contemporary framers – notably those discharging 
their role in developing economies – will not be able to keep foreign actors 
and ideas entirely at bay.
II. Bridging the global and the local: Towards the glocalisation of 
constitution-making
Constitutions between the global and the local
‘Constitutions,’ Jackson has observed, ‘are bearers of particular conceptions 
of national identity.’13 The view that constitutions are autochthonous, and 
ought to be so, has a rich pedigree and can be traced back to the writings 
of Montesquieu and Hegel, amongst others.14 The autochthonous 
character of a constitution can be linked to ideas of sovereignty: a nation’s 
constitution, it might be said, is the ultimate form of internal self-expression 
and arguably necessary for participation in the international community 
of states. On this view, it is natural to assume that the making of a new 
13 V Jackson, Constitutional Engagement in a Transnational Era (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2009) 3.
14 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (AM Cohler et al. eds and trans, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 1989); G Hegel, Outlines of the Philosophy of Right (TM Know 
trans, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008).
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Glocalised constitution-making in the twenty-first century 303
constitution would be a localised affair; the pouvoir constituent is found 
within the community for which that fundamental charter is intended, or 
in its chosen or self-appointed representatives.15 The understanding of 
constitutions as locally produced and situated may find expression in the 
preambles of such documents: think of the famous invocation of ‘We the 
People’ by the US Constitution.16
At the same time, constitutions reflect the setting in which they are made. 
That setting is no longer exclusively national in nature (if ever it was). In 
1994, Friedman theorised that ‘In a world bound together by television, 
satellites, and jetports, there is a certain melting together of world cultures; 
and legal cultures can hardly stay immune.’17 His expectation that the 
advent of globalisation would produce a growing convergence in law has 
been echoed in the comparative constitutional discourse. In a classic 
piece, Tushnet has posited that the globalisation of constitutional law, 
understood as the ‘convergence among national constitutional systems 
in their structures and in their protections of fundamental human rights’, 
is inevitable.18 Various theories have been fashioned to account for (the 
expectation of) constitutional convergence.19 Some have suggested that 
States and their constitution-writers will learn from each other,20 either as 
doing so would be efficient, because it holds out the promise of emulating 
foreign success in the domestic setting or because of the belief that there 
are a finite number of general constitutional ideas and mechanisms.21 
Others point to the existence of a ‘law market’, where nations are spurred 
to adopt similar or superior constitutional guarantees of personal and 
economic freedom to attract investment and skilled labour. Yet others 
15 For constituent power, see A Arato, The Adventures of the Constituent Power: Beyond 
Revolutions? (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017).
16 T Ginsburg, D Rockmore and N Foti, ‘We the Peoples: The Global Origins of 
Constitutional Preambles’ (2014) 46 George Washington International Law Review 305.
17 L Friedman, ‘Is There a Modern Legal Culture?’ (1994) 7 Ratio Juris 117, 125.
18 M Tushnet, ‘The Inevitable Globalization of Constitutional Law’ (2009) 49 Virginia 
Journal of International Law 985, 987–95. See also J-R Yeh and W-C Chang, ‘The 
Emergence of Transnational Constitutionalism: Its Features, Challenges and Solutions’ (2008) 
27 Pennsylvania State International Law Review 89, 97, positing that ‘In all directions of the 
globe, there are now similar constitutions.’
19 See in particular DS Law and M Versteeg, ‘The Evolution and Ideology of Global 
Constitutionalism’ (2011) 99 California Law Review 1172; R Dixon and E Posner, ‘The Limits 
of Constitutional Convergence’ (2010) 11 Chicago Journal of International Law 399.
20 This has been aided by the development of a knowledge society, with vast opportunities 
for the circulation of information, such as through constitutional databases like the Constitute 
Project.
21 So e.g. W Osiatynski, ‘Paradoxes of Constitutional Borrowing’ (2004) 1 International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 244, 244.
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304 maartje de visser and ngoc son bui
argue that convergence is due to the wish to gain acceptance and support 
from domestic and, crucially, international audiences and reap attendant 
benefits. China’s modification of its constitution with a view to joining the 
WTO or the influence that the prospect of joining the EU and Council of 
Europe has on the former communist states in Central and Eastern Europe 
can be mentioned as examples here.22 It should be noted that these theories 
as well as empirical studies tracing the impact of the forces of globalisation 
have been principally geared towards the content and judicial application 
of constitutions,23 but not the actual making thereof. Moreover, as 
Tushnet’s definition reveals, the focus has very much been on detecting the 
presence of similarities in the make-up and interpretation of bills of rights 
and models of governance.24
The underlying assumption of this article is that the phenomenon of 
globalisation is also relevant and already present during the logically prior 
stage of constitution-building. It would be difficult to imagine how some 
measure of substantive constitutional convergence can come about in the 
absence of globalising tendencies during the process stage. Understanding 
why a particular constitution bears resemblance to, or deviates from, other 
constitutional texts requires an examination of the extent to and manner 
in which external elements were present during its writing and adoption. 
This is all the more so for those invested in the promotion of universal 
minimum standards.25 This dovetails with the greater emphasis placed on 
process in contemporary constitution-making as compared to the beginning 
of the twentieth century. To be fair, traditional constitution-builders and 
thinkers already accepted that process mattered, in the sense that the 
constitution’s status as higher law meant the need for a different set of 
steps and requirements than those governing the drafting of ordinary 
legislation. The significance of process has, however, intensified markedly 
in the recent past due to the extension of exacting ‘norms of democratic 
procedure, transparency and accountability’ from the sphere of quotidian 
political decision-making to constitution-drafting.26 This makes it both 
22 Cf e.g. arts 49 and 2 TEU.
23 Z Elkins, T Ginsburg and B Simmons, ‘Getting to Rights: Treaty Ratification, 
Constitutional Convergence, and Human Rights Practice’ (2013) 54 Harvard International 
Law Journal 64; Law and Versteeg (n 19); Dixon and Posner (n 19); DS Law, ‘Globalization and 
the Future of Constitutional Rights’ (2008) 102 Northwestern University Law Review 1277.
24 E.g. C McCrudden, ‘A Common Law of Human Rights? Transnational Judicial 
Conversations on Constitutional Rights’ (2000) 20 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 499.
25 E.g. M Sunder, ‘Enlightened Constitutionalism’ (2005) 37 Connecticut Law Review 
891, arguing that the court of world opinion should initiate a transnational dialogue in 
response to envisaged deviations from liberal constitutional values by constitution-makers.
26 V Hart, ‘Democratic Constitution Making’ (2003) Special Report 107 of the United States 
Institute of Peace.
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Glocalised constitution-making in the twenty-first century 305
more feasible and relevant to uncover the complex mix of ingredients 
and blending thereof that has produced a given country’s Grundnorm. 
Bismarck’s assertion that like sausages, one should not wish to see laws 
being made, is no longer defensible in the twenty-first century.
Glocalised constitution-making
Against this backdrop, what is needed is a framework that combines a 
bottom-up perspective buttressed by local empirical findings with an 
appreciation of the presence of the global level. To capture this interplay, 
we will refer to the ‘glocalisation’ of constitution-making. The origins 
of this neologism have been traced to Asia, with glocalisation making 
an appearance in discussions about Japanese marketing practices in the 
1980s. The concept has, however, found more general theoretical favour. 
The writings of Roland Robertson,27 Eric Swyngedouw28 and George 
Ritzer29 in particular have been instrumental in extending glocalisation 
beyond the domain of business and economic factors to culture and 
sociological aspects. While the term has made an occasional appearance in 
constitutional legal writings,30 it has yet to be substantively theorised and 
mainstreamed in the language of constitutional law. We suggest that 
there would be good reasons for such to happen. Globalisation is associated 
with cultural homogenisation or even cultural imperialism, with tastes, 
beliefs and attitudes overcoming spatial constraints (‘McDonaldisation’). 
The corollary of this employment of the concept is the flat juxtaposition of 
the global (or universal) and the local (or particular): unstoppable economic 
forces will compress the world and in the process reduce if not eliminate 
heterogeneity in local value systems. For those concerned about this advent 
of globalisation, this can give rise to a siege mentality: the local is ‘under 
threat’, should be ‘defended’ and show itself resilient in the face of a ‘clash’, 
even if it may not be ultimately victorious in the battle for supremacy. 
27 R Robertson, Globalization: Social Theory and Global Cultures (Sage, London 1992); 
R Robertson, ‘Glocalization: Time-Space and Homogeneity-Heterogeneity’ in M Featherstone, 
S Lash and R Robertson (eds), Global Modernities (Sage, London, 1995); R Robertson, 
‘Globalization Theory 2000+: Major Problematics’ in G Ritzer and B Smart (eds), Handbook 
of Social Theory (Sage, London, 2003).
28 E Swyngedouw, ‘Neither Global nor Local: ‘‘Glocalization’’ and the Politics of Scale’ in 
K Cox (ed), (Guilford, New York, NY, 1997); E Swyngedouw, ‘Globalisation or ‘Glocalisation’? 
Networks, Territories and Rescaling’ (2004) 17 Cambridge Review of International Affairs 25.
29 G Ritzer, The Globalization of Nothing (Sage, London, 2003); G Ritzer, Globalization: 
A Basic Text (Wiley-Blackwell, London, 2010).
30 E.g. T Fleiner and L Basta Fleiner, Constitutional Democracy in a Multicultural and 
Globalised World (Springer, New York, NY, 2009) 9; R Hirschl, Comparative Matters: The 
Renaissance of Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014) 282.
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Glocalisation holds out the promise of overcoming such a mindset and 
opens up analytical space. It ‘should be a concept analytically distinct from 
globalization’.31 Rather than privileging the global, it signals that local 
actors, relationships and settings too matter, and do so from the outset; 
and it accepts that ideas or concepts that are distributed globally should be 
customised to local considerations. The outcome is neither purely local 
nor purely global, but hybrid in nature: a fusion of the two that has its 
own authenticity. The very terminology used signals that the global and 
local are interlaced and should not be viewed as distinct spheres. Put 
simply, the global is shaped by the local and vice versa. As Robertson 
posits: ‘Much of what appears at first experience to be local is the local 
expressed in terms of a generalised recipe of locality. Even in cases where 
there is no concrete recipe – as in the case of some forms of contemporary 
nationalism – there is, or so I would claim, a translocal factor at work; the 
basic idea here being that the assertion of ethnicity and/or nationality is at 
least made within contemporary global terms of identity and particularity.32
When analysing the process of making a national constitution, a 
glocalised perspective invites reflection on the identification, origins and 
meaning of supposed global norms pertaining to constitution-making. 
It also directs attention to the attitude towards such norms on the part 
of local framers and their capacity to interact with the global arena, its 
inhabitants and interests. These dual considerations entail the possible 
conceptualisation of contemporary constitution-making situations as a 
‘glocalised enterprises’, in which global (or transnational) and municipal 
forces, norms and actors pertaining to the drafting and design of 
constitutions co-exist, interact or shape one another. We suggest that a 
glocalised examination of constitution-building can take place along 
three dimensions: the decision to embark upon the writing of a new 
constitution; the design and inclusiveness of the process; and the range 
of topics canvassed for possible constitutional regulation.
Glocalised Impetus. At the most general level, the decision to draft a new 
constitution stems from the perceived need or desire for reform and as 
such, there is a decidedly instrumental quality to constitution-making 
processes. While the triggers for constitution-making exist in the political, 
economic and social realm, their study ought not to be left to political 
31 V Roudometof, Glocalisation: A Critical Introduction (Routledge, Abingdon, 2016) 1.
32 R Robertson, ‘Globalisation or glocalisation?’ (2012) 18 Journal of International 
Communication 191, 192 (original emphasis). Here he inter alia refers to the work by Greenfield 
on nationalism, who shows that the emergence of national identities in the US, Germany and 
Russia developed as part of an ‘essentially international process’.
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scientists, historians or anthropologists. These are the meta-factors that 
have an indelible influence on how the process will unfold as well as on the 
content of the resulting document. Whether a new constitution is made 
due to the creation of a new state, out of fear of regime collapse, with the 
hope of putting to rest ethnic or social conflict or to attract more riches 
will yield variations in the sense of urgency felt on the part of the drafters 
and the time frame available to complete the process, the choice of the 
parties around the negotiating table and the issues at the forefront of 
the deliberations. At the same time, and despite the supposedly exclusive 
national character of some of these imperatives, the global dimension is 
unavoidably present as well, as the vignettes of recent Asian experiences 
with constitution-making below will show. These further show that the 
salience of the global arena for any given constitution-making exercise 
is not predetermined or fixed, but rather varies across jurisdictions 
and time.
In East Timor, the origins for a new constitution can be traced to 
1999, when the population of this island nation expressed itself against 
incorporation within the Republic of Indonesia on the heels of the departure 
of the Portuguese colonial administration. The unrest brought about by 
the vote in favour of full independence led the international arena, 
acting through the UN Security Council, to establish an International 
Force for East Timor (INTERFET) to restore peace and security. INTERFET 
led a short-lived existence and was succeeded by the United Nations 
Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), whose mandate 
extended to ‘support capacity-building for self-government’. For East Timor, 
as other newly independent States, there was a need for a constitution 
to make self-government a reality. Institutions had to be set up, or provided 
with a new legal basis, to exercise sovereign powers alongside spelling out 
the conditions for and limits of those powers to the benefit of the local 
population.33 At the same time, the necessity of crafting a constitution 
in these scenarios extends to the international level. While the Montevideo 
Convention on the Rights and Duties of States does not explicitly demand 
a constitution as a prerequisite for a State’s legal existence, it is difficult 
to conceive how a political organisation can demonstrate that it meets 
the criteria that are listed – a permanent population, a defined territory, 
government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states34 – and 
33 LE Miller and L Aucoin, ‘East Timor’s Constitutional Passage to Independence’ in 
LE Miller and L Aucoin (eds), Framing the State in Times of Transition: Case Studies in 
Constitution-Making (US Institute of Peace Press, Washington, DC, 2010).
34 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 165 LNTS 19; 49 Stat 
3097, art 1.
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hence claim its place within the international community of states in the 
absence of a basic constitutive document.35
Bhutan offers an interesting variant on the theme of drafting a new 
constitution where none existed before. The country has been ruled as an 
absolute monarchy for most of its history, which inter alia meant that 
there was no document with the attributes normally associated with a 
constitution.36 In 2001, King Jigme Singye Wangchuck agreed to surrender 
the monarchy’s powers and privileges, paving the way for the creation of 
an elected assembly to draw up a new constitution for ‘an inclusive 
democratic republic nation’. The king’s decision has been explained as a 
testament to his belief in the intrinsic value of democracy as a ‘system of 
government best suited for the future well-being of the nation’. A closer 
look shows that wider geopolitical factors brought influence to bear as well, 
particularly the global appeal of the model of constitutional democracy 
and its embrace by neighbouring Nepal, where the demise of the centuries-
old monarchy was accomplished resolutely and swiftly. A democratic 
constitutional framework was arguably also required to keep the potential 
flaring of ethnic tensions between Lhotsampas migrating from Nepal and 
indigenous Drupka at bay.37 As a commentator noted: ‘[The King] knew 
that in a rapidly globalising world, Bhutan could not sustain its isolationist 
path; he also knew, looking at developments in neighbouring Nepal, that 
sooner or later there would be a democratic challenge to an absolute 
monarchy. In view of this, he chose to anticipate the inevitable by initiating 
change himself.’38 A final exogenous factor that exerted peripheral pressure 
were the gains to be obtained from India once a constitution would be in 
place. Upon the initiation of the drafting process, the aid it received from 
India increased by five per cent and following the implementation of 
the new constitution in 2008, India ended its prorogation of Bhutan’s 
competences over the country’s external affairs.39
35 See also N Walker, ‘Sovereignty and Beyond: The Double Edge of External 
Constitutionalism’ (2018) 58 Virginia Journal of International Law 799.
36 See e.g. Y Hasebe and C Pinelli, ‘Constitutions’ in M Tushnet, T Fleiner and C Saunders 
(eds), Routledge Handbook of Constitutional Law (Routledge, Abingdon, 2013); D Grimm, 
‘Types of Constitutions’ in M Rosenfeld and A Sajó (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012).
37 V Iyer, ‘Constitution-making in Bhutan: A Complex and Sui Generis Experience’, 
paper presented at the Workshop ‘Constitution-Making in 21st Century Asia’ (Singapore, 
13–14 November 2017) (copy on file with the authors).
38 PK Varma, ‘How Democracy Took Roots in Bhutan’ (The Hindu, 1 April 2015) 
<https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/columns/How-democracy-took-roots-in-Bhutan/
article10752146.ece>.
39 W Bothe, ‘The Monarch’s Gift: Critical Notes on the Constitutional Process in Bhutan’ 
(2012) 40 European Bulletin of Himalayan Research 27, 37.
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The recent constitution-making in Sri Lanka and Nepal was induced 
by rather different domestic conditions. Both countries were motivated 
to conclusively resolve the long period of social turmoil that had damaged 
political stability and led to economic stagnation. Sri Lanka has suffered 
almost three decades of bloody separatist fighting by the Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Eelam against national security forces to secure autonomy for 
the Tamils, who are the country’s largest minority group. This played 
out against the wider backdrop of ‘the national question’: how much and 
what kind of decentralisation of powers should be pursued to accommodate 
Sri Lanka’s many religious and ethnic minorities.40 Nepalese society is, if 
anything, even more diverse in its make-up, with more than 100 languages 
beyond spoken and its 29 million people grouped into a myriad of castes 
and corresponding hierarchies. The dominant cause for its new constitution-
writing project was the need to give effect to the 2006 peace accord 
between the country’s traditional parties and the Maoists that saw the 
latter end their decade-long civil war and agree to continue the fight 
for their beliefs without violence within conventional political forums. 
Yet, despite the overt domestic character of the forces that induced 
constitution-making in Sri Lanka and Nepal, international elements 
augmented the need for these processes and helped keep the momentum 
going. There was a general expectation within the international community 
that both countries ought to seize the opportunity for peace-building, 
as this would contribute to regional stability and improve cross-trading 
prospects. A specific contributory factor in the case of Nepal was the 
25 April 2015 earthquake. By then, negotiations about a new constitution 
had been ongoing for years and the realisation that much-needed 
international financial aid could be jeopardised if the process would 
drag on for much longer, put pressure on the government to wrap up the 
process.41
At first blush, the Thai story varies markedly from those recounted 
above. The by now familiar pattern in which coups, military-dominated 
governments and new constitutions have alternated since the late 1990s 
suggests an exclusively domesticated approach to constitution-drafting 
40 On which, e.g. NS Cooray and S Abeyratne (eds), Decentralization and Development of 
Sri Lanka within a Unitary State (Springer, Singapore, 2017); M Yusoff et al., ‘Decentralized 
Administration and Minority Accommodation in Sri Lanka’ (2015) 6 Mediterranean Journal 
of Social Sciences 1; R Oberst, ‘Decentralization and Local Government in Sri Lanka’ in 
D Vajpeyi (ed), Local Democracy and Politics in South Asia (Springer, Wiesbaden, 2003).
41 For more detail, see S Bisarya, ‘Forces and Mechanisms in Plurinational Constitution-
Building in South Asia’ in IDEA (ed), Annual Review of Constitution-Building Processes: 2015 
(International IDEA, Stockholm, 2016).
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that unfolds in a manner that reflects the relative strength of competing 
Thai economic and political interests. The desire to break that vicious 
cycle by institutionalising military government was the impetus for the 
latest bout of constitution-making in 2017.42 A closer look, however, 
reveals that even in the apparently self-referential Thai story, evidence of 
global pressures can be detected. It was hoped that the pursuit of political 
stability through a new constitution will also yield a boost in FDI, since 
the coups and military grip on government have significantly reduced 
investment in the country on the part of the US, China and the EU.43 This 
would not be unprecedented: after acceding to the WTO, Thailand 
amended its then-constitution to ensure a ‘fairer investment environment’, 
a sensible move for a country seeking to climb the developmental ladder.
Glocalised Design and Inclusiveness of the Process. The second dimension 
of a glocalised study of constitution-making pertains to the design and 
inclusiveness of the drafting process. This refers to the series of steps that 
must be completed before the entry into force of the text and are likely to 
encompass all or most of the following: deciding on the identity of the 
institutional body with principal responsibility for preparing a draft text, 
selecting its members and determining the parameters within which it 
should complete that task; fashioning the modalities, if any, for consultation 
and feedback on the draft; completion of the text and its adoption; and 
finally, its official entry into force. In studying the inclusiveness of the 
process across its multiple stages, a distinction can be usefully drawn 
between participation of the local body politic and the involvement of 
transnational advisors and materials.
Taking the former first, international law today recognises that ‘the 
people’ should be involved in the making of their new constitution. 
Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) declares that every citizen shall have the right ‘to take part in 
the conduct of public affairs’. In its 1991 Marshall and ors v Canada44 
ruling, the United Nations Committee on Human Rights (UNCHR) already 
clarified that ‘public affairs’ encompasses constitution-making. It reiterated 
this conclusion in its 1996 commentary on Article 25, declaring that 
42 M Crouch and T Ginsburg, ‘Between Endurance and Change in South-east Asia: The 
Military and Constitutional Reform in Myanmar and Thailand’ in IDEA (ed), Annual Review 
of Constitution-Building Processes: 2015 (International IDEA, Stockholm, 2016) 68, 75–6.
43 Cf Yeh and Chang (n 18); A Harding and P Leyland, The Constitutional System of 
Thailand: A Contextual Analysis (Hart, Oxford, 2011).
44 Human Rights Committee, Comm No 205/1986 (Appl No) UN Doc CCPR/C/43/ 
D/205/1986, Oxford Reports on International Law 1735 (UNHCR 1991).
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‘Citizens also participate directly in the conduct of public affairs when 
they choose or change their constitution.’45
Ratification by means of a popular referendum became a favoured 
approach over the course of the previous century, with the rise of public 
consultation and feedback sessions on the rise since the new millennium. 
Indeed, as Saunders remarks, ‘People now expect actually to be involved 
in the constitution-making process and not just symbolically associated 
with it.’46 This ties in with the usual justification for public participation, 
namely that it enhances the legitimacy and thereby the effectiveness and 
durability of the resulting constitution.47 Empirical data further suggests 
that involving the population in constitution-making has an impact on the 
substance of the text, more particularly the presence of rights and certain 
democratic institutions.48
At the same time, the manner in which the people can partake in the 
constitution-building process varies and with Hart it can be said that 
‘there is no model appropriate to all nations’.49 Participation, then, is 
paradigmatic illustration of glocalisation: originally practised locally, it 
has been elevated into a global norm, or generalised recipe as Robertson 
put it, that is in turn realised using local ingredients. It is worth pointing out 
that the global norm only requires that the public should be involved, 
but is silent on when and how such involvement should take place. The 
leeway thus granted for local adaptation can result in markedly different 
trajectories, as in the recent Asian constitution-making exercises. Across 
the states that embarked on constitution-building, there was a keen 
awareness among the drafters that the public should be involved in part to 
gain (or retain) international legitimacy. The precise format chosen, and 
the degree to which this exemplified the spirit behind the expectation of 
popular involvement, was, however, contingent on the prevailing political 
context. The convergence began and ended with the local acceptance of 
the global norm.
45 UN Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 25: Article 25 (12 July 
1996, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7).
46 C Saunders, ‘Constitution-Making in the 21st Century’ (2014) 4 International Review 
of Law 1, 2.
47 See e.g. V Hart, ‘Constitution-Making and the Transformation of Conflict’ (2001) 26 
Peace & Change 153; S Voigt, ‘The Consequences of Popular Participation in Constitutional 
Choice – Towards a Comparative Analysis’ in A van Aaken, C List and C Lütge (eds), 
Deliberation and Decision: Economics, Constitutional Theory and Deliberative Democracy 
(Ashgate, Aldershot, 2004).
48 T Ginsburg, Z Elkins and J Blount, ‘Does the Process of Constitution-Making Matter?’ 
(2009) 5 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 1.
49 Hart (n 26) 11.
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The population of East Timor had relatively wide opportunities to be 
involved in constitutional design from the outset, mainly due to the fact 
that the process was largely conducted under the auspices of UNTAET 
(on which more below). Its international origins and mandate meant that 
UNTAET could be expected to pay heed to the then-emerging norm of an 
inclusive, transparent and participatory constitution-making exercise.50 
Additionally, the years of UN-led governance made it particularly 
important to cultivate a sense of national ownership and give the Timorese 
a solid foundation for their new State’s constitutional identity. UNTAET 
established constitutional commissions to solicit grass-roots input, with 
almost 10 per cent of the electorate attending the hearings organised for 
this purpose.51 It also provided civil education to familiarise the Timorese 
with voting, which was important as the delegates to the Constituent 
Assembly charged with drafting, debating and adopting the constitution 
would be directly elected. Timorese leadership, however, appeared less 
enamoured of efforts to engage the local population. Many of those in 
the upper echelons of the dominant political association FRETILIN 
(Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor) had spent years in 
exile in Portugal and Mozambique and their intention was to simply model 
the new Timorese text after the constitutions of those two states. This 
meant that public participation would be superfluous at best, and even 
dangerous as the local citizenry could put forward suggestions at odds 
with the desired templates. The legacy of the 1975 civil war further 
hampered a strong local endorsement of participation: it would be better 
‘to keep the lid on debate, to get things moving quickly’52 rather than 
risk polarisation at the time when achieving social unity for the new 
State should be the main goal. At the insistence of some local elites, the 
Constituent Assembly did organise public consultations that again solicited 
high levels of interest, but perhaps unsurprisingly, these made little difference 
to the eventual text of the constitution.
The constitution-making exercise in Sri Lanka formally commenced 
with the conversion of its Parliament into a Constitutional Assembly. 
50 See now UN Secretary General, ‘Guidance Note of the Secretary General: United Nations 
Assistance to Constitution-making Processes’ (April 2009), <https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/
blog/document/guidance-note-of-the-secretary-general-united-nations-assistance-to-
constitution-making-processes/> 4.
51 Constitutional Affairs Branch, Department of Political Affairs, UNTAET, ‘A Report of 
the National Constitutional Consultation in East Timor, June–July 2001’ (UNTAET, Dili, 
2001).
52 A Regan, ‘Constitution-making in East Timor: Missed Opportunities?’ in D da Costa 
Babo Soares et al. (eds), Elections and Constitution Making in East Timor (Australian National 
University, Canberra, 2003) 40.
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The Resolution doing so envisages a strong participatory and public 
quality to the entire process. The Assembly was charged with ‘seeking the 
view and advice of the People’53 and to this end appointed a Public 
Representations Committee for Constitutional Reform that visited each of 
the country’s 25 districts and amassed more than 4,000 submissions that 
led it to suggest a host of dramatic reforms.54 The Assembly further 
maintains a free website with a repository of all committee reports as well 
as public representations it has received.55 The final draft, once ready, is to 
be approved in a nationwide referendum. Whether it will come to that is 
far from certain, however. There is strong resistance among sections of 
Sri Lankan society, including influential Buddhist leaders, to the devolution 
of powers proposed to resolve the discrimination and oppression felt by 
the Tamil minority. Additionally, a March 2017 opinion poll found that 
more than two-thirds of Sri Lankans are of the view that instead of pursuing 
constitutional reform and transitional justice the government should devote 
itself to more pressing economic and developmental issues, in particular 
‘cost of living, infrastructure development, economy of the country and 
unemployment’.56 Such sentiments suggest that despite the existence of 
a framework that put in place multiple avenues for the public to partake 
in or learn about the constitution-making process, these are unlikely to 
produce the legitimacy-conferring benefits typically associated with 
participation due to the absence of a constitutional moment in Sri Lanka 
at this point in time (and that is even assuming that there would be 
sufficient grass-roots support for the contentious changes envisaged to the 
existing constitutional settlement).
In Thailand, the drafters’ apparent concern to (be seen to) pay homage 
to the global norm of participation found its way into the text of the 
Constitution itself. The preamble to the 2017 recounts how
The Constitution Drafting Committee … has provided the people 
opportunities to widely access to the Draft Constitution and its meaning 
through different media, and has involved the people in the development of 
the essence of the Draft Constitution through receiving recommendations 
53 Sri Lanka Parliament, ‘Resolution for the Appointment of the Constitutional Assembly’ 
(9 March 2016) point 1.
54 See Public Representations Committee on Constitutional Reform, ‘Report on Public 
Representations on Constitutional Reform’ (May 2016) <http://english.constitutionalassembly.
lk/images/pdf/PRC_1.pdf>.
55 <https://english.constitutionalassembly.lk>. Cf Resolution for the appointment of the 
Constitutional Assembly (n 53) points 4(b), 11 and 12.
56 Centre for Policy Alternatives, ‘Opinion Poll on Constitutional Reform’ (CPA, Colombo, 
2017) <http://www.cpalanka.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Rapid-survey_final-report_March- 
2017.pdf> 2.
ht
tp
s:
//
do
i.o
rg
/1
0.
10
17
/S
20
45
38
17
19
00
00
66
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fr
om
 h
tt
ps
:/
/w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e.
 IP
 a
dd
re
ss
: 5
4.
70
.4
0.
11
, o
n 
13
 Ju
l 2
01
9 
at
 0
7:
21
:1
8,
 s
ub
je
ct
 to
 th
e 
C
am
br
id
ge
 C
or
e 
te
rm
s 
of
 u
se
, a
va
ila
bl
e 
at
 h
tt
ps
:/
/w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e/
te
rm
s.
314 maartje de visser and ngoc son bui
on possible revisions. Once the preparation of the Draft Constitution 
was complete, copies of the Draft Constitution and a brief primer were 
disseminated in a way which allowed the people to easily and generally 
understand the main provisions of the Draft Constitution, and a 
referendum was arranged to approve the entire Draft Constitution.57
In actual fact, though, the referendum and the campaign that preceded it 
were tightly controlled by the Thai military. They did not allow any 
campaigning against the draft and more than 100 politicians, journalists 
and civil society members who were critical of the proposed text or had 
issued calls to reject the constitution in the referendum were reportedly 
arrested.58 Put differently, the Thai military elites carefully delimited the 
scope for participation of the local population in keeping with their 
preferences regarding the content of the 2017 Constitution and the 
corresponding need for its swift and smooth adoption.
Since the impetus for constitutional transformation in Bhutan came 
from the King, the drafting process was very much ‘top-down’ in approach, 
with the monarchy firmly in the driver’s seat.59 The preparation of the text 
of the new constitution was entrusted to a committee chaired by the chief 
justice and comprising government officials alongside a small number of 
clergymen. It was only after the draft was completed that the public was 
engaged, as the purpose of participation was in large part educational, to 
wit, instruct Bhutanese citizens in democratic thinking to enable the 
transition from an absolute to a constitutional monarchy. Every household 
received a copy of the proposed text and numerous road shows were held 
throughout the country, several of which were attended by the King and 
the then-crown prince.60 The engagement of the public was also deemed 
necessary to imbue the constitution with legitimacy61 and lend credence to 
the narrative that the King bestowed it as a ‘gift’62 on his subjects, who 
could simultaneously be heralded in the preamble as the constituent power 
of Bhutan’s new constitutional arrangements.
The Nepalese story shows how the opportunity for and type of popular 
participation does not remain constant even within the same jurisdiction and 
57 Thailand Constitution (2017), preamble.
58 Human Rights Watch, ‘Thailand: Events of 2016’ <https://www.hrw.org/world-
report/2017/country-chapters/thailand>.
59 See e.g. SD Muni, ‘Bhutan: Marching towards Democracy’ (Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, Singapore, 2008); Iyer (n 37).
60 LS Tobgye, The Constitution of Bhutan: Principles and Philosophies (Thimphu, no 
publisher stated, 2015) 20.
61 Ibid 10.
62 Bothe (n 39).
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over the course of a single constitution-building enterprise.63 A Constituent 
Assembly was first created in 2008, comprising 575 popularly elected 
members and 21 members nominated by the Council of Ministers.64 The 
Assembly in turn set up a Committee on Citizens and a Committee on the 
Collection and Coordination of Public Opinion to foster mass participation 
through inter alia raising awareness about participation opportunity, 
collating input and organising public hearings.65 The process was designed 
to be as inclusive as possible, in that no individual or entity was prevented 
from making their voice heard, and yielded result: more than half a million 
contributions were submitted to the Assembly.66 The Assembly was, 
however, unable to produce a constitution and it was succeeded by an 
identically constituted second Constituent Assembly in 2015.67 Different 
from the previous cycle, the scope for public input was circumscribed: 
there was an exceedingly brief period of public consultation – a mere two 
days – held after the draft text of the constitution had been agreed and no 
public hearings were organised.68 The decision to keep the citizenry at 
bay has been attributed to the realisation on the part of the Nepalese 
elites that the successful conclusion of the constitution-making process 
required ‘negotiated compromises’.69 In a comparable vein, others have 
pointed to the existence of ‘disputes and conspiracies’ between political 
leaders and Constituent Assembly members70 that required the kind of 
delicate management that can only happen away from the public eye.
The involvement of the international community in national constitution-
making processes similarly evinces and calls for a glocalised perspective, 
even more so than the design of avenues to engage the local population. 
Such international involvement can take the form of foreign agencies 
(experts, organisations, other States) actively injecting themselves in the 
constitutional process as well as the proactive consideration of international 
and foreign materials by domestic drafters. Non-national involvement in 
63 See generally B Karki and R Edrisinha (eds), Participatory Constitution-Making in 
Nepal: Issue of Process and Substance (United Nations Development Programme, Kathmandu, 
2014).
64 A Saati, ‘Participatory Constitution-Building in Nepal – A Comparison of the 2008–
2012 and the 2013–2015 Process’ (2017) 10 Journal of Politics and Law 33.
65 Ibid 33–4.
66 K Hachhethu, ‘Legislating Inclusion: Post-war Constitution Making in Nepal’ (2017) 26 
Accord 60.
67 Saati (n 64) 35.
68 Hachhethu (n 66).
69 R Edrisinha, ‘Challenges of Post Peace Agreement Constitution Making: Some Lessons 
from Nepal’ (2017) 9 Journal of Human Rights Practice 436.
70 D Jha, Federal Nepal: Trials and Tribulations (Aakar, New Delhi, 2018) preface.
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constitution-making has a long and rich pedigree. When Japan’s Meiji 
government embarked on the drafting of what would become its 1889 
constitution, it solicited the assistance of two German experts.71 External 
involvement became progressively more systematic over the course of the 
twentieth century. The post-war constitutional reform efforts in the 
aggressor states of Japan and Germany were conducted under the auspices 
of the Allied Forces72 and the transfer of sovereignty and drafting of the 
constitutional settlements of soon-to-be-former colonies in Africa, Latin 
America and Africa were typically tightly guided, and guarded, by the 
outgoing colonial powers.73 During the democratic transition in Central and 
Eastern Europe after the fall of communism in the 1990s, international 
advisory groups comprising scholars, diplomats and legal professionals 
made themselves available to the local drafters as did organisations such as 
the Venice Commission, whose very establishment was borne out of the 
wish of mainly Western European states to have an institution devoted to 
help the CEE countries with restructuring their constitutional arrangements.74
Today, it is rare for domestic constitution-making processes to take 
place without any form of external involvement, solicited or otherwise. 
This is unlike the experiences in earlier times: interventions by non-local 
actors are no longer reserved for new countries or transitioning regimes, 
but also routinely offered to mature democracies. In a related vein, the 
identity and number of contemporary constitution mongers extend 
beyond States to international organizations, NGOs, consultancy groups 
and individuals, and include entities whose very mission is to provide 
constitutional guidance.75 This, together with the realisation that no 
aspect of the constitution seems immune from susceptibility to external 
guidance,76 means that the role played by external actors and the 
71 See further G Akita, Foundations of Constitutional Government in Modern Japan 
1868–1900 (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1967).
72 For Germany, see e.g. US Department of State, Germany 1947–1949: The Story in 
Documents (US Department of State Publishing, Washington, DC, 1950); E Spevack, ‘American 
Pressures on the German Constitutional Tradition: Basic Rights in the West German 
Constitution of 1949’ (1997) 10 International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 411. 
Questioning whether Japan’s constitution lacks an autochthonous character as a result: D Law, 
‘The Myth of the Imposed Constitution’ in D Galligan and M Versteeg (eds), The Social and 
Political Foundations of Constitutions (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013).
73 See e.g. Kumarasingham (n 7); Lapping (n 7).
74 On which e.g. M de Visser, ‘A Critical Assessment of the Role of the Venice Commission 
in Processes of Domestic Constitutional Reform’ (2015) 63 American Journal of Comparative 
Law 701.
75 For a recent discussion, see T Ginsburg, ‘Constitutional Advice and Transnational Legal 
Order’ (2017) 2 UC Irvine Journal of International, Transnational and Comparative Law 5.
76 L Backer, ‘From Constitution to Constitutionalism: A Global Framework for Legitimate 
Public Power System’ (2009) 113 Penn State Law Review 671.
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ramifications thereof must be systematically featured in case studies of 
national constitution-making processes.
A first important step is identifying the range of entities involved and 
tracing the source of their funding, which is not always easy as conventional 
actors like the United Nations are increasingly flanked by associations 
purposely set up for a particular constitution-making process. In the case 
of Nepal, for instance, assistance was amongst others rendered by the 
Supporting Constitution Building Process in Nepal project supported by 
the Embassy of Norway in Nepal (from 2006 to 2015 and by the Embassy of 
Finland (from 2009 to 2013); the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) Supporting Participatory Constitution Building in Nepal; the 
United States Agency for International Development; the Department 
for International Development’s Enabling State Programme; and the 
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation.77 Not only the size of 
the international delegation can be substantial, so too can the resources 
invested. Foreign constitutional assistance has become big business: the 
total expenditure for Nepal has been estimated to be approximately 
600 million USD.78
There is, of course, no such thing as a blank canvas for international 
input. In his account of the making of the Bhutanese constitution, the 
chairman of the Drafting Committee identified 12 ‘basic sources of 
the Constitution’, several of which had non-local origins: 20 foreign 
constitutions, ‘[v]arious international conventions and political philosophies’ 
and observations made by international organisations and individuals. 
These were positioned alongside and contextualised by Bhutanese sources, 
including Buddhist philosophies, royal decrees, indigenous customs and 
traditions and ‘historical documents and laws codified by our ancestors’.79 
Indeed, as Tushnet correctly observes, ‘What primarily determines the 
content of constitutions are the intensely local political considerations ‘‘on 
the ground’’ when the constitution is drafted.’80 This is so even in the case 
of newly formed States, like East Timor. The entire Timorese process 
took place while the country was still governed under a UN transitional 
administration and the strong presence of the UN encouraged foreign 
NGOs, activists and experts to similarly flock to the incipient nation to 
77 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Nepal’s Constitution 
Building Process: 2006–2015: Progress, Challenges, and Contributions of International 
Community (Publications Office International IDEA, Stockholm, 2015) 33–5.
78 Ibid 29.
79 Tobgye (n 60) 14.
80 M Tushnet, ‘Some Skepticism about Normative Constitutional Advice’ (2008) 49(4) 
William & Mary Law Review 1473.
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offer their services. At the outset, UNTAET mainly made the necessary 
financial and logistical resources available to the local drafters to reduce 
the risk that the constitution would be characterised as foreign or imposed. 
As the process unfolded, the UN officials assigned to observe the meetings 
of the Constituent Assembly also began to provide substantive suggestions, 
in particular to ensure adherence to international human rights standards.81 
While some have lauded UNTAET’s approach to generally place itself at 
arm’s length of the constitution-making process, other observers have 
been more critical. Its concern for a locally led process, they argue, made 
for an unbalanced approach to empower local elites, with UNTAET 
winding up privileging the largest and savviest of the parties (FRETILIN), 
which was accordingly able to manipulate the work of the Constituent 
Assembly to serve its own interests and influence the eventual text of the 
constitution considerably. The East Timor story serves as a stark reminder 
that local stakeholders are not a homogenous group with a single, shared 
set of objectives; and international agents should accordingly not only be 
concerned with preserving domestic ownership, but simultaneously avoid 
capture by certain elites that seek international assistance to better entrench 
their views in the new constitutional settlement.
The Timorese experience allows for two further observations about 
international involvement. The first is the duration of the entire process of 
constitution-building. In the case of East Timor, the preparatory works, 
the establishment of the Constituent Assembly and the actual drafting 
were due to be completed within a year, a time frame that reflected the 
availability of donor budgets and the Security Council’s patience. While 
international assistance may be instrumental in equipping national actors 
with the tools to acquit themselves of their task as best as they can, time 
constraints dictated by foreign financial concerns can hamper achieving 
agreement about the new legal and political structures. This is especially 
concerning in nations with a pluralist character and carries with it 
potentially dramatic consequences for the endurability of the constitution. 
In a related vein, while Nepalese elites generally welcomed foreign 
constitutional aid efforts, there was also criticism that some international 
projects that focused on the empowerment of disadvantaged communities 
exacerbated frictions among indigenous groups.82 When we recall the 
highly diverse character of Nepalese society, it becomes apparent that 
good intentions on the part of international actors – like combating 
81 J Wallis, ‘Cut and Paste’ Constitution-making in Timor Leste’, paper presented at the 
Workshop ‘Constitution-Making in 21st Century Asia’ (Singapore, 13–14 November 2017) 
(copy on file with the authors).
82 IDEA (n 77) 36.
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disenfranchisement – may play out completely differently depending on 
prevailing local conditions.
The second observation concerns the characterisation of members of the 
diaspora. Many of the delegates in the Timorese Constituent Assembly 
that determined critical aspects of the new constitutional system had 
returned to the country after a lengthy stay overseas. The presence of such 
individuals blurs the global–local participation distinction: while they 
arguably cannot be analogised as ‘pure’ locals as their views will have been 
coloured by their experiences abroad, neither are they foreigners: their 
investment in a successful constitutional settlement will be stronger and 
more personal than that of foreign agents. Such individuals are perhaps 
best conceived as the personification of glocalisation.
Alongside providing logistical support geared to capacity-building or 
civic education, international actors aim to draw the drafters’ attention to 
foreign or international sources that they believe ought to be reflected in 
the new constitution. Local constitution-makers should not be thought of 
as merely passive recipients of such materials, however. On the contrary, 
they commonly decide to investigate foreign systems and rules of their 
own volition, as the Bhutanese experience already revealed. Looking at the 
choices made in this regard is critical, as this tells us which foreign 
constitutional regimes the drafters themselves consider to be instructive 
and possibly worthy of emulation, and in relation to which areas. Consider, 
by way of example, the report by the sub-committee on fundamental rights 
to the Sri Lankan Constitutional Assembly, which remarks in its opening 
sentence that ‘recognition of and respect for human rights is a … universal 
concept’ thereby setting the tone for its chosen approach and methodology.83 
Committee members took note of a wide range of international covenants 
as well as the contemporary trend among countries in the Global South to 
recognise justiciable socio-economic rights, including those that have 
drafted new constitutions in the wake of periods of internal turmoil – 
much like Sri Lanka. South Africa was identified as the jurisdiction with a 
particularly ‘progressive and innovative’ Bill of Rights that moreover has 
the longest genesis in the Global South. This made it the ideal jurisdiction 
for members of the sub-committee to visit for a constitutional fact-finding 
mission to learn about ‘the implementation of social and economic rights 
and judicial review of State action’.84
83 The Constitutional Assembly of Sri Lanka, ‘Report of the Sub-Committee on Fundamental 
Rights’ <https://english.constitutionalassembly.lk/images/pdf/reports-2018/Fundamental%20
rights%20report%20English%20final.pdf> 3.
84 Ibid 6.
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Glocalised range of topics for constitutional regulation. The third and 
final dimension of a glocalised exploration of constitution-building is 
concerned with the range and type of governance questions that a new 
constitution ought to tackle. Several of these have and are featured in 
each and every constitution-making process, simply because ‘there are 
a limited number of general constitutional ideas and mechanisms [that] 
have been in the air for some time’.85 These include the identity of the State 
and the framework for governance as well as the protection of fundamental 
rights and liberties. These universal evergreens also come with universal 
expectations as to the implementation thereof, at least as far as the 
broad strokes are concerned. All (quasi-)democratic systems follow the 
principle of political morality that demands that State powers are not 
concentrated in the hands of a single institution. The implementation thereof 
has traditionally taken place along the lines of the classic Montesquieuan 
tripartite approach.86 Similarly, framers of twenty-first century constitutions 
are expected to ensure that their bill of rights complies with international 
treaties guaranteeing such rights, notably those with/of a civil and 
political character.87
The influence of international actors and materials on the specific selection 
of governance questions that constitution-makers should deliberate is 
undeniable and growing. This is notably the case for the design of the 
section of rights, as this is a favoured item for guidance among foreign 
experts and entities. In the case of Nepal, the Peace Accord – which, it will 
85 Osiatynski (n 21) 244.
86 Montesquieu envisaged a functionalist separation of government powers into legislative, 
executive and judicial power in his The Spirit of Laws (vol I, 1750). Discussions of its historical 
origins and present-day application can, amongst others, be found in S Krause, ‘The Spirit of 
Separate Powers in Montesquieu’ (2000) 62 Review of Politics 231; P Resnick, ‘Montesquieu 
Revisited, or the Mixed Constitution and the Separation of Powers in Canada’ (1987) 20 
Canadian Journal of Political Science 97; JH Merryman, ‘The French Deviation’ (1996) 44 
American Journal of Comparative Law 109. In contrast Taiwan’s constitution divides 
government powers among five branches or yuans: the legislative, executive, judicial, examination 
and control branch, on which e.g. E Ip, ‘Building Constitutional Democracy on Oriental 
Foundations: An Anatomy of San Yat-Sen’s Constitutionalism’ (2008) 9 Historia Constitucional 
373. Notably the idea of distinct control institutions alongside the regular judiciary has begun 
to find traction more generally, see B Ackerman, ‘The New Separation of Powers’ (2000) 113 
Harvard Law Review 633 and M Tushnet, ‘Fifth-Branch Institutions: South Africa’ in DS 
Law (ed), Constitutionalism in Context (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2019, 
forthcoming).
87 See generally, Z Elkins, T Ginsburg and B Simmons, ‘Getting to Rights: Treaty 
Ratification, Constitutional Convergence, and Human Rights Practice’ (2013) 54 Harvard 
International Law Journal 61.
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be recalled, was the principal reason to trigger the constitution-making 
exercise – contained an explicit commitment to ‘the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, 1948, and international humanitarian laws and fundamental 
principles and values related to human rights’.88 The insistence by the 
international community that this Peace Accord be given effect to, coupled 
with the population’s desire for a democratic regime in which their interests 
would be duly safeguarded, meant that both constitutional assemblies 
devoted considerable time to debates on how international human rights 
norms should be reflected in the new constitution. The strong involvement 
of the UN in East Timor similarly meant that compliance with the rights 
established under international law, many under the auspices of the UN, 
ranked high on the agenda. One particular question concerned the scope 
ratione personae of the section on rights. The initial draft contemplated 
citizens as the principal addressees, which induced the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights and the Transitional Administrator 
to write to the Speaker of the Assembly respectively the leaders of the 
political parties represented therein to signal their disquiet about this 
move. Their intervention solicited some effect: the final text guarantees 
many fundamental liberties to all, although the drafters left the 
limitation in place for certain rights.89
Irrespective of any explicit suggestion to this effect by external experts 
and organisations, drafters of new constitutions may themselves decide to 
place rights protection questions on the agenda to ensure that the new 
constitution is in step with perceived global tendencies. The report by the 
Sri Lankan sub-committee mentioned earlier offers a good illustration. It 
notes that the absence of justiciable socio-economic rights in the country’s 
1978 constitution was consistent with the general approach to such rights at 
the time that text was drafted. However, ‘in light of global developments in 
human rights it has become clear that the intrinsic link between political 
rights and freedoms and access to economic resources and a better quality 
of life can no longer be overlooked … particularly so in a country such 
as ours where deprivation of such resources has led to violent conflicts in 
the past’.90 The sub-committee accordingly recommended that it was 
‘of paramount importance’ that the new constitution include justiciable 
88 Comprehensive Peace Accord between the Nepal Government and the Communist Party 
of Nepal (Maoist) (22 November 2006) preamble and see also points 3.4–3.9.
89 Including the right to equality (East Timor Constitution, section 16); special protection 
for seniors (section 20); access to the Ombudsman (section 27) and access to personal data 
(section 38).
90 Report of the Sub-Committee on Fundamental Rights (n 83) 7.
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socio-economic rights and went on to proffer suggestions on the desired 
formulation of such rights for consideration by the Constitutional Assembly.
While confirming the role played by the global level in setting the agenda 
of constitutional framers, the Asian experiences also attest to the enduring 
relevance of the local context. The examples just given already hint at this, 
but this is worth explicating further. Consider Bhutan, whose society is 
animated by Buddhism, something that is celebrated in the constitution as 
a defining aspect of that State’s identity.91 According to Buddhist thought, 
each person must perform moral duties so that all can enjoy the rights 
conferred upon them.92 This made the question of identifying these 
duties and deciding which ought to be given constitutional recognition 
an important topic for the drafting committee. The result can be found 
in Article 8 of the Bhutanese constitution, which enumerates 11 duties 
owed towards the self, the environment, society at large and the Nation. 
Several of these have an obvious Buddhist flair, such as the duty not to 
tolerate or partake in inflicting harm on other human beings (subsection 5) 
or the duty to uphold justice (subsection 9). Turning back to East Timor, 
the large number of exiles who had had to live abroad made the treatment 
of the diaspora a salient question to consider. This resulted in section 22, 
which extends the State’s protection for the exercise of fundamental 
rights to citizens while they are overseas. In a related vein, the oppression 
experienced during the years of Indonesian occupation explains why 
the question whether citizens must always abide by legislation regardless 
of its compliance with core rights was placed on the constitutional agenda. 
This produced section 28, which enshrines a constitutional right to 
civil disobedience.
Thailand’s latest constitution-making exercise shows local interests 
shaping the agenda regarding the kind of institutional arrangements that 
should be debated. The new king instructed the military government to 
consider his role and powers as well as the circumstances in which a regent 
must be appointed to perform royal duties. It has been suggested that the 
underlying reason is the king’s penchant to spend time abroad without 
having to hand over the reins and publicly announce his absence from the 
country. The junta duly obliged and the 2017 Thai constitution stipulates 
that ‘[w]henever the King is absent from the Kingdom ... [he] may or 
may not appoint … a Regent’.93 The military government itself added the 
91 Bhutan Constitution, art 3(1).
92 On which, see e.g. KN Jayatilleke, Dhamma Man and Law (Buddhist Research Society, 
Singapore, 1988).
93 Thailand Constitution 2017, Section 16.
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regulation of political parties, rules on conflict of interest for politicians and 
the protection of ‘Thai-ness’ (the trinity of nation, religion and monarchy) 
to the list of topics for possible constitutional recognition. Its intention 
in doing so is to circumscribe the room for a return to power of the 
Shinawatras or their allies, as the pressure to hold elections and at least 
officially transition back from military to elected government is increasing. 
In Nepal too, local concerns have led the framers of its new constitution 
to move beyond the options generally available on the menu when 
thinking about governance arrangements. As the constitution is 
intended to address if not overcome antecedent ethnic divisions, it was 
important to think about the avenues to be created for members of 
minority groups to enhance their standing in society and take remedial 
action for encroachments upon their interests.94 This has prompted the 
creation of dedicated commissions to promote the integration of different 
ethnic groups in mainstream Nepalese society – like the Dalit, Adibasi 
Janajati, Madheshi and Tharu95 – that will operate alongside a general 
human rights commission of the sort that is by now a common feature in 
many constitutions.
The survey in this section has sought to demonstrate the value of 
adopting a glocalised perspective when studying (foreign) constitution-
building exercises. It has already hinted at the manner in which local 
framers may respond to global templates and international guidance, and 
it is to this that we now turn.
III. The effects of glocalised constitution-making
As mentioned earlier, much of the discourse dealing with the pressures 
associated with globalisation and related foreign influences on domestic 
constitutional law has suggested that constitutional regimes will progressively 
come closer together.96 This remains an attractive position among scholars 
and activists, many of whom believe that such convergence is desirable as 
it will – or so they suppose – mean more protection for more rights and 
more democracy-supporting institutions (think of constitutional courts, 
human rights commissions, electoral commissions, Ombudsmen and the like). 
94 H Phuyal, ‘Nepal’s New Constitution: 65 Years in the Making’ (The Diplomat  
18 September 2015).
95 Nepal Constitution, arts 255, 261–263.
96 Law and Versteeg (n 19); N Dorsen et al. (eds), Comparative Constitutionalism (3rd edn, 
West, St Paul, MN, 2016); DS Law, ‘Generic Constitutional Law’ (2005) 89 Minnesota Law 
Review 652.
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Some comparatists have, however, begun to push back against the 
convergence thesis, arguing that it is an oversimplified representation of 
reality.97 Dixon and Posner have suggested that ‘quite special conditions’ 
must be met before global convergence can occur, such as similarity in 
social conditions and aspirations for future development across states 
or the ability on the part of foreign actors to actually nudge a country 
towards the former’s preferred position.98
In a related vein, writing in the context of the consequences of 
globalisation for courts and constitutional adjudication, Jackson identifies 
a continuum of ‘postures’.99 The opposing poles are convergence, reflecting 
full identification with and endorsement of transnational legal norms, and 
resistance, which entails an outright refusal to accept non-national sources. 
The middle ground, which seems particularly common in practice and 
which Jackson herself also prefers for normative reasons, 100 is called 
‘engagement’: this entails judges using transnational law to heighten their 
‘capacities for more informed and impartial deliberation about the content 
of their own constitutional norms’ and is accordingly ‘open to possibilities 
of either harmony or dissonance between national self-understandings and 
transnational norms’.101
97 See e.g. R Hirschl, ‘Out of “Global Constitutionalism”’ (2018) 12 Law & Ethics of 
Human Rights 1; S Choundry, ‘The Lochner Era and Comparative Constitutionalism’ (2004) 
2 International Journal of Constitutional Law 1; C Saunders, ‘The Use and Misuse of 
Comparative Constitutional Law’ (The George P. Smith Lecture in International Law) (2006) 
13 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 37; K Lane Scheppele, ‘Aspirational and Aversive 
Constitutionalism: The Case for Studying Cross-Constitutional Influence through Negative 
Models’ (2003) 1 International Journal of Constitutional Law 296; Li-ann Thio, ‘Reception 
and Resistance: Globalisation, International Law and the Singapore Constitution’ (2009) 4 
National Taiwan University Law Review 335.
98 Dixon and Posner (n 19) 1.
99 V Jackson, Constitutional Engagement in a Transnational Era (Oxford University Press, 
New York, NY, 2010). For an interesting extension of her framework that considers the 
impact of having non-national judges on the bench to adjudicate constitutional cases, see 
A Dziedzic, ‘Foreign Judges on Pacific Courts: Implications for a Reflective Judiciary’ (2018) 
Federalismi no 5.
100 The debate on the desirability of the consideration of foreign decisions in the course of 
domestic constitutional adjudication has spawned a large literature, including a discussions of 
the manner and extent to which such actually happens and the justifications that can be 
advanced in support, or against, the practice. See e.g. T Groppi and M-C Ponthoreau (eds), The 
Use of Foreign Precedents by Constitutional Judges (Hart, Oxford, 2014); Hirschl (n 4) Ch 1; 
N Dorsen, ‘The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in US Constitutional Cases: A Conversation 
between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer’ (2005) 3 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 519; G Halmai, ‘The Use of Foreign Law in Constitutional Interpretation’ 
in Rosenfeld and Sajó (n 36); M Bobek, Comparative Reasoning in European Supreme Courts 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013) Chs 11 and 13.
101 Jackson (n 99) 71.
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We submit that local constitutional framers too may exhibit a range of 
attitudes towards the global.102 More particularly, while some may adopt 
a stance of approbation and pursue convergence with (perceived) globalised 
norms for some issues, the vast majority do not embrace foreign influences 
unqualifiedly. While global norms and actors may inform the making of 
a new national constitution, these do not control that process; rather, 
they provide sites for reflective consideration. This validates Dixon and 
Posner’s diagnosis that ‘rigorous empirical work has so far not found any 
evidence’ to corroborate the convergence thesis as far as the content of 
constitutions is concerned.103 At the same time, we should realise that it is 
increasingly difficult for framers to completely withstand the injection of 
international actors and ideas in the (design of the) process. Let us explain 
why, before setting out the considerations that should be borne in mind in 
making sense of attitudes of engagement.
Where the constitution-building process is conducted under the auspices 
of an international organisation, framers are faced with a powerful 
exogenous constraint in deciding on their attitude vis-à-vis the global. In 
the case of East Timor, for instance, many of the local elites were opposed 
to involving the citizenry in the early stages of the process. They could thus 
be said to adopt a posture of aversion to the (emerging) global norm of 
mass participation. The UN transitional administration, however, insisted 
on public outreach and overrode the contrary preferences of the Timorese 
drafters in this regard. Such occurrences will arguably be few and far 
between: the UN (or other international organisations) do not often play 
the part of an international interim administration and its Secretary 
General has since indicated that the UN endeavours to empower, rather 
than constrain, constitutional framers.104
Despite not being in a position to shape the design of a constitution-
making process de iure, international organisations and third states can 
de facto wield such power that local drafters find it difficult to give 
them and their views short shrift. This is a common scenario: developing 
countries with immature legal systems often simply lack the resources 
to go it alone. As we have seen in the case of Nepal, these countries are 
102 On occasion, membership of both groups may overlap, on which R Dixon, 
‘Constitutional Design Two Ways: Constitutional Drafters as Judges’ (2017) 57 Virginia 
Journal of International Law 1.
103 Dixon and Posner (n 19) 19.
104 UN Secretary-General, Guidance Note of the Secretary-General: United Nations 
Assistance to Constitution-Making Processes (April 2009) <https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/
files/Guidance_Note_United_Nations_Assistance_to_Constitution-making_Processes_FINAL.
pdf> notably at 4 (‘Ensure national ownership’).
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reliant on support from the international community to organise mass 
participation or process the results thereof and will have to accept the 
partial loss of control over the constitution-making process attendant on 
international involvement.105 In a related vein, the financial imperatives of 
raising loans or foreign investments can circumscribe resistance. For 
example, in Sri Lanka the EU principle of subsidiarity has been put forward 
as the guiding principle for centre–periphery relations to meet international 
political conditionalities for capital injections, despite concerns that this 
runs against the current tenet for organising the vertical allocation of 
power and could lead to acrimony between the different echelons.106 We 
should thus realise that while local drafters may not like the involvement 
of external actors in the process or display indifference about shaping the 
process to conform to (quasi-)global norms and expectations, they can 
effectively be prevented from making their preferred internal posture count 
in the way that the constitution-writing exercise eventually unfolds. In 
other words, the ‘aversion’ end of the spectrum may be only a hypothetical 
option rather than a real choice for framers in countries lacking a well-
developed antecedent constitutional system or economic prowess.
At the same time, it is unlikely for the pendulum to swing in the opposite 
direction, with constitutional drafters fully opening the process to the 
global arena. The Bhutan experience is instructive here. It will be recalled 
that in Bhutan, the process was initiated by the king’s and his outlook on his 
preferred type of constitution exerted a strong influence over the mindset 
and approach of those entrusted with the actual drafting of the constitution. 
Across the Asian countries discussed in this article, the Bhutanese king 
exhibited the strongest preference for ensuring that his country’s new 
constitution would be aligned with international and foreign law. This can 
be gleaned clearly from his prescription of the matters that ought to be 
regulated in the constitution, the vast majority of which are familiar and 
indeed expected to be covered in any modern-day constitution worthy of 
that epithet: a preamble, fundamental rights and duties, the role and 
responsibilities of the three branches of government, local government, 
105 Contrast M Versteeg and E Zackin, ‘American Constitutional Exceptionalism Revisited’ 
(2014) 81 University of Chicago Law Review 1641, arguing that the US’ economic standing 
allows it to pursue a policy of isolationalism.
106 The Constitutional Assembly of Sri Lanka, ‘Report of the Sub-Committee on 
Centre-Periphery Relations’ <https://english.constitutionalassembly.lk/images/pdf/reports-2018/ 
Subcommittee%20report%20on%20Centre-Periphery%20relations%20English%20final.
pdf> 246; D Weerasekera, ‘The Interim Report of the Constitutional Steering Committee 
of Sri Lanka: A Brief Analysis, Part 2’ (Lankaweb, 9 April 2018) <https://www.lankaweb.
com/news/items/2018/04/09/the-interim-report-of-the-constitutional-steering-committee-
of-sri-lanka-a-brief-analysis-part-2/>.
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democracy-supporting institutions such as the creation of an anti-
corruption commission, and amendment provisions.107 In line with this 
command, the Constitution Drafting Committee accordingly studied around 
100 foreign constitutions ‘to benefit from their wisdom and knowledge, 
avert the criticisms and to accede to universal values’.108 At the same time, 
members of the committee were far more reticent in embracing direct 
foreign input. In the chairman’s account of the constitution-making 
process, we can read that the international community provided feedback 
on the draft text at various junctures and offered experts. None of these 
overtures, however, appears to have been accepted or even welcomed. As 
the chair explained: ‘Bhutan needed an acknowledged authority with 
positive disposition to Bhutan … Further, over-representation by experts 
would not have gained public receptivity and would have compromised 
the provisions of the Constitution. Experts from different legal backgrounds 
would not have produced a homogeneous Constitution.’109 In the end, the 
drafting committee invited a senior lawyer from neighbouring India to be 
the sole external contributor to its work. This example underscores that 
even in a context that was particularly conducive to the influence of the 
global, framers were acutely aware of the importance of grounding the 
constitution-making process in the local extra-legal environment to bolster 
its social legitimacy and effective operationalisation. When we consider 
that in most instances, leading local constituencies with the ability to influence 
the conduct of the actual drafters will be less enamoured of the global than 
was the case in Bhutan, the adoption of an uncritical stance of approbation 
seems as unlikely as unmitigated opposition.110
For these reasons, some degree of engagement with the global emerges 
as the typical, and arguably also most reasonable, attitude for drafters to 
adopt. This is in fact what actually happened in the Bhutanese example in 
the previous paragraph: the drafters practised measured deliberation on 
the merits of adopting global norms and inviting (certain) non-domestic 
actors to participate in aspects of the constitution-writing exercise.
Now, the discussion so far may have created the impression that a 
country’s constitution-making process in toto can be characterised as 
manifesting a particular stance vis-à-vis the global arena. To be clear, 
107 Royal audience by His Majesty Jigme Singye Wangchuck (22 September 2001), 
referenced in Tobgye (n 60) 6–7.
108 Tobgye (n 60) 17.
109 Ibid 16 (emphasis added).
110 It is probably also undesirable, given the risk of considerable dissonance between the 
constitutional text eventually adopted and preferred practice that in turn may negatively 
impact on the longevity of the new constitution.
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that is not our argument: indeed, trying to place the entire drafting exercise 
in a single pigeon hole would be overly reductionist. The attitudes are 
better thought of as contingent and thematically determined, meaning that 
a whole range can be seen within a single constitution-making exercise and 
even within retail-level topics. Nepal offers a good example.
Consider first the ebb and flow of the debate about the creation and 
powers of a constitutional court in Nepal during its first Constituent 
Assembly. The Judicial System Committee (JSC) that conduced preparatory 
work for the Constituent Assembly had suggested parliamentary oversight 
over the judiciary, in line with the preferences of the Communist Party 
of Nepal (CPN). Given its political leanings, the CPN’s view was that 
constitutional interpretation should be entrusted to a Special Judicial 
Committee of Parliament, using the arrangement in place in foreign 
(former) socialist countries as the template for its proposal.111 The minority 
in the JSC was concerned that this would create tension with ‘universally 
accepted values of independence, impartiality and accountability’112 and 
counter-proposed a constitutional court. This idea was taken up by the 
Report Harmonization Committee, tasked with consolidating the work 
done by all the subcommittees. The CPN members on the Constituent 
Assembly eventually abandoned their resistance to a constitutional court, 
with some of them apparently having been swayed to do so following 
private meetings with a justice of the South African Constitutional Court 
who had socialist proclivities prior to his elevation to the bench.113 The 
critical reception of the idea of a constitutional court by the CPN had, 
however, paved the way for opposition from the Nepalese judiciary. While 
several sitting judges too had attended meetings with the South African 
constitutional justice and a German constitutional judge, they were 
unconvinced about the propriety of including a constitutional court in the 
country’s new judicial architecture. They accepted that such an institution 
made sense in the particular historical contexts of constitution-making 
in South Africa and Germany. However, Nepal’s judiciary had already 
championed fundamental rights and democratic principles in its case law, 
‘but adopting [a] constitutional court does not recognise its role and may even 
diminish … the active role it played for the equal and democratic society’.114 
111 Committee on Judicial System, ‘Preliminary report to the Constituent Assembly with 
Concept Paper’ (Kathmandu, 2009).
112 Quoted in H Phuyal, ‘The Constitutional Court Debate in Nepal: Where Are We 
Heading?’ in Karki and Edrisinha (n 63) 281.
113 Ibid 282–3.
114 Ibid 284 and see also AM Bhattarai, ‘Designing the System of Justice for Federal Nepal: 
Possible Contributions of Comparative Constitutional Law’ (2011) 5 NJA Law Journal 115.
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Their preference was for constitutional review powers to be allocated to the 
Supreme Court instead. This opposition had effect: the various positions 
on the creation of a constitutional court resulted in the Constituent 
Assembly placing the matter on the list of ‘dissenting items’ that was 
referred for resolution to the High Level Political Mechanism, comprising 
the leaders of the main Nepali political parties. The Mechanism eventually 
settled on a compromise: a constitutional court would be established, 
but only for a five-year period to adjudicate centre–periphery disputes 
and helmed by the chief justice of the Supreme Court. The Constituent 
Assembly, however, collapsed before this recommendation could be 
implemented. Still, the design eventually agreed upon shows how the 
attitudes among the drafters towards the structure of the judiciary initially 
accepted a strong role for the global in answering this design query, 
with the embrace of two opposing global models by different factions 
within the Assembly.115 Over time, their attitudes evolved: foreign 
involvement initially helped to broker a consensus of sorts in favour of 
convergence if not full-fledged endorsement of the popular constitutional 
court option, but this was followed by backtracking to a decidedly sui 
generis design after local stakeholders inserted themselves in the 
constitution-drafting process.
Second, both Nepali Constituent Assemblies agreed that women’s 
rights were an important topic that the new constitution should regulate 
in some detail, with several of the sub-committees deliberating how 
emerging universal norms to protect women and promote gender parity 
could be incorporated. This was in large part due to the emphasis placed 
on women’s rights by the international community in its communications 
with the drafters. Yet, its provisions on passing citizenship to children 
differentiate between Nepali fathers and mothers in favour of the former,116 
despite intense lobbying by women’s groups and repeated expressions of 
concern by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women that this is not in line with international non-discrimination 
rules.117 In an interesting twist, the Assembly’s chairman has indicated 
that the adoption of these provisions do not evince the drafters’ aversion 
115 The tendency to ensure representation of the various social, religious and other factions 
often translates into a body of constitutional framers that is heterogeneous in its world views. 
This makes it difficult for a single, unified view to emerge on how to structure the constitution-
writing process and which constitutional arrangements to adopt, and by implication, how to 
appreciate the input that the global can provide on these matters.
116 Nepal Constitution, art 11(5) and (7).
117 Cf Committee on Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 989th and 990th 
meetings (WOM/1873, July 2011).
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to global norms, but rather demonstrate a posture of engagement. ‘[T]he 
new constitution is women-friendly … [g]iven our geostrategic location, 
our citizenship provision is not discriminatory’ (emphasis added).118 One 
might not have expected him to declare otherwise: drafters who have been 
actively involved in constitution-building may congratulate themselves on 
its successful completion and defend the outcome, warts and all, all the 
more so if the process has been long-drawn-out as in Nepal. Even so, his 
remark is important: it reveals that domestic elites and international actors 
may differ in their interpretation of the choices made in fashioning a 
glocalised constitution-making process. Those studying these issues should 
accordingly be careful when deciding where on the aversion–approbation 
spectrum to place a specific aspect of a national constitution-drafting 
exercise.
Finally, as Elster observed in his famous article on the forces and 
mechanisms that regulate constitution-making processes, constitutions 
ideally ‘ought to be adopted in maximally calm and undisturbed conditions’, 
yet in reality the process is frequently embarked upon only once ‘a 
crisis is impending’.119 One corollary is that framers do not always come 
to the constitution-making table with a predetermined model of what 
the end product or road towards it should look like; and concomitantly, 
with clear views on the role envisaged for foreign constitutional norms 
or international entities. This is especially likely when it comes to 
questions of procedural design or topics for constitutional regulation 
introduced to the framers by foreign states or international entities, as 
opposed to having been raised by local elites or grass-roots movements. 
For such issues, there will be a large degree of happenstance as to how 
the global–local interplay plays out and which attitude is eventually 
adopted.
IV. Conclusion
The crafting of modern-day constitutions is not a purely domestic 
enterprise, if it ever was. The ubiquitous presence of the international 
community, a desire to secure more FDI or other commodities from third 
states and an expanding corpus of universal rules all combine to expose 
domestic constitution-writing processes to global influences. This calls for 
118 ‘Interview with Former Nepal Constituent Assembly Chair’ (2016) 5 The UN 
Constitutional 3.
119 J Elster, ‘Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process’ (1995) 45 Duke 
Law Journal 364, 394.
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micro-level studies that take seriously the inevitably interplay between the 
global forces and domestic realities. This article has put forward the 
concept of glocalised constitution-making as a useful prism in this respect. 
It not only emphasises the multitude of sites for the global and the local to 
encounter one another, from providing the catalyst to initiate a constitution-
making exercise to the design of the process itself to the composition of the 
agenda. Crucially, the glocalisation prism also underscores that the global 
and the local are interlaced, with neither being privileged at the expense of 
the other and with both changing over the course of their interaction.
A challenging question that remains concerns the attractiveness of the 
status quo and how this can be retained or, conversely, adjusted. At least 
for now, crafting a new constitution remains a locally encultured process. 
As ideational, political, socio-economic and cultural settings differ, so too 
do the national trajectories followed and the attitudes exhibited towards 
glocalisation by drafters. Indeed, there is no single, common model for 
glocalised constitution-making across the Asian countries referenced in 
Sections II and III. In some countries and for some constitutional tropes, 
the global elements are more prominent; in other cases, local factors 
dominate. Yet there seems to be an evolutionary dynamic towards a 
growing involvement and corresponding greater impact of the global 
arena. Scholars and policymakers alike accordingly need to think about 
what this means for the idea of national ownership and perceptions of the 
legitimacy of the constitution. If we continue to subscribe to the popular 
‘We the People’ fiction, this may require the formulation of guidelines or 
principles setting out how constitutional framers can best harness local 
values and translate or mute global pressures in addressing local concerns, 
especially as foreign actors pursue the implementation of universal norms 
with growing vigour and not infrequently for self-interested reasons.
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